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Upon reading Einstein's views on quantum incompleteness in publications or in his 
correspondence after 1935 (the EPR paradox), one gets a very intense feeling of deja-vu. 
Einstein presents a quantum hole argument, which somewhat reminds of the hole argument in 
his 1914 "Entwurf" theory of general relativity. PBR write in their paper, "An important step 
towards the derivation of our result is the idea that the quantum state is physical if distinct 
quantum states correspond to non-overlapping distributions for [physical states] λ". PBR then 
conclude, "The general notion that two distinct quantum states may describe the same state of 
reality, however, has a long history. For example, in a letter to Schrödinger containing a 
variant of the famous EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) argument", and they refer to Einstein's 
quantum hole argument. This short paper discusses the PBR theorem, and the connection 
between the PBR argument and Einstein's argument and solution.   
 
In philosophy we usually make a distinction between two views: the view that 
something corresponds directly to reality, observation-independent: refers to what is 
there, what is "physically real", and independent of anything we say, believe, or know 
about the system. In this case, quantum states represent knowledge about an 
underlying reality, real objects, real properties of quantum systems. 
David Wallace explains that if we consider Schrödinger’s cat gedankenexperiment, 
then from the above point of view, Schrödinger’s cat in superposition of two states is 
a monster inside a box: both alive and dead cat at the same time. How come then 
when we open the box and observe (and measure) the both alive and dead cat at same 
time, we only see alive cat or dead cat? The orthodox interpretation of quantum 
mechanics invokes the collapse of the wave function whereby the act of observing the 
cat causes it to turn into alive-cat or dead-cat state. If the quantum state is a real 
physical state, then collapse is a mysterious physical process, whose precise time of 
occurrence is not well-defined. Accordingly, people who hold this view are generally 
led to alternative interpretations that eliminate the collapse, such as Everett’s relative 
state formulation of quantum mechanics, many-worlds theory.
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The "state of knowledge" view, observation-dependent: refers to experimenter’s 
knowledge or information about some aspect of reality; what we think, know, or 
believe what is reality. We presuppose tools of observation and measurement. In this 
case, the quantum state does not represent knowledge about some underlying reality, 
but rather it only represents experimenter's knowledge or information about some 
aspect of reality; his knowledge about the consequences of measurements that we 
might make on the system; it does not imply the existence of any real physical 
process. 
From this anti-realist point of view, collapse of the wavefunction need be no more 
mysterious than just the instantaneous Bayesian updating of a probability distribution 
upon obtaining new information: Hence Schrödinger’s cat is also not at all 
mysterious.
 
When we consider superposition of states, both alive and dead cat at the 
same time, we mean that it has a fifty percent probability of being alive and a fifty 
percent probability of being dead (what is the likelihood of the cat being dead or 
alive). The process depends for its action on observations, measurements, and the 
knowledge of the observer. The collapse of the wave function corresponds to us 
observing and finding out whether the cat is dead or alive.
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Erhard Scheibe introduced the notions of epistemic and ontic states of a system. The 
Ontic state of the system is the system just the way it is, it is empirically inaccessible. 
It refers to individual systems without any respect to their observation or 
measurement. On the other hand, the epistemic state of the system depends on 
observation and measurement; it refers to the knowledge that can be obtained about 
an ontic state.
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As commonly understood, Bohr was advocating epistemic physics while Einstein was 
considering ontic physics. And indeed Jaynes wrote that the two physicists were not 
discussing the same physics: "needless to say, we consider all of Einstein's reasoning 
and conclusions correct on his level; but on the other hand we think that Bohr was 
equally correct on his level, in saying that the act of measurement might perturb the 
system being measured, placing a limitation on the information we can acquire and 
therefore on the predictions we are able to make. There is nothing that one could 
object to in this conjecture, although the burden of proof is on the person who makes 
it". Hence, the famous Bohr-Einstein debate was never actually resolved in favor of 
Bohr – although common thinking even among physicists and philosophers of science 
is that it was.
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Anton Zeilinger polled 33 participants of a conference on the foundations of quantum 
mechanics on their interpretations of quantum physics, and he found that philosophers 
of science indeed favored "Bohr". Zeilinger asked the participants: "Do you believe 
that physical objects have their properties well defined prior to and independent of 
measurement?" As to Einstein's view of quantum mechanics, he asked: "Is it correct?" 
No one thought it was. "Is it wrong?" 64% thought so. "Will it ultimately turn out to 
be correct?" 6% thought it would. Zeilinger's conclusion was: "In wording our 
question, we deliberately did not specify what exactly we took Einstein's view of 
quantum mechanics to be. It is well known, in fact, that Einstein held a variety of 
views over his lifetime. The overarching themes we were after, and the themes most 
people, we believe, would associate with Einstein – are a subtle flavor of realism, as 
well as the possibility of a deeper description of nature beneath quantum mechanics. 
Interestingly, none of the respondents brought himself to declaring Einstein's view as 
correct, although two people suggested that Einstein would ultimately be vindicated. 
One respondent sounded a conciliatory note. 'Einstein's view is wrong. But he still 
thought more clearly than anyone else in his time. There is still much to learn from 
him'."
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Zeilinger asked: "Bohr's view of quantum mechanics: Is it correct?" 21% thought it 
was correct. Zeilinger concluded: "Just as with the previous question about Einstein's 
view of quantum mechanics, we did not elaborate on the specifics of what we meant 
by 'Bohr's view.' Bohr, of course, has become associated with a variety of positions, 
and it is likely that in responding to the question, each participant had a slightly 
different set of ideas and slogans in mind." (Bohr's interpretations are different from 
what we call the Copenhagen interpretation).
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The million-dollar question is: What does a quantum state represent? What is the 
quantum state? Is the quantum wavefunction an ontic state or an epistemic state? 
Using the terminology of Harrigan and Spekkens, let us ask: is it possible to construct 
a ψ-ontic model? A ψ-ontic hidden variable model is a quantum state which is ontic, 
but we construct some underlying ontic hidden variable states theory. Hidden variable 
theories are always ontic states theories. 
Or else, is it possible to construct a ψ-epistemic model? A ψ-epistemic hidden 
variable model is a quantum state which is epistemic, but there is some underlying 
ontic hidden state, so that quantum mechanics is the statistical theory of this ontic 
state.
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In a paper entitled, "On the Reality of the Quantum State" by Matt Pusey, Jon Barrett 
and Terry Rudolph (henceforth known as PBR), PBR answer the above question in 
the negative, ruling out ψ-epistemic theories, and attempting to provide a ψ-ontic 
view of the quantum state.
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PBR present a no-go theorem which is formulated for an ontic hidden variable theory: 
any model in which a quantum state represents mere information about an underlying 
physical state of the system must make predictions which contradict those of quantum 
theory. In the terminology of Harrigan and Spekkens, the PBR theorem says that ψ-
epistemic models cannot reproduce the predictions of quantum theory.
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The PBR theorem holds only for systems that are prepared independently, have 
independent physical states (independent preparations). A system has an ontic hidden 
state λ. A quantum state ψ describes an experimenter's information which corresponds 
to a distribution of ontic hidden states λ. PBR show that when distinct quantum states 
ψ correspond to disjoint probability distributions of ontic hidden variables (i.e., what 
PBR call independent preparations, they do not have values of ontic hidden variables 
in common), these quantum states ψ are ontic and they are not mere information. PBR 
write that in this case the quantum state ψ can be inferred uniquely from the physical 
state of the system and hence satisfies the definition of a physical property. 
"Informally, every detail of the quantum state is 'written into' the real physical state of 
affairs". And if the states of a quantum system do not correspond to ontic disjoint 
probability distributions (the distributions of the values of ontic hidden values 
overlap), the quantum wavefunctions are said to be epistemic. "Our main result is" 
that for distinct quantum states ψ, if the distributions overlap, "then there is a 
contradiction with the predictions of quantum theory".10 
The PBR theorem is in the same spirit as Bell’s no-go theorem, which states that no 
local theory can reproduce the predictions of quantum theory. Bell’s theorem was 
formulated for ontic hidden variable theory as well. Bell’s theorem shows that a ψ-
epistemic hidden variable theory which is local is forbidden in quantum mechanics, 
i.e, any ψ-epistemic hidden variable theory must be non-local in order to reproduce 
the quantum statistics of entanglement (EPR).  
According to the EPR 1935 paper, it seems that Einstein favored a ψ-epistemic local 
interpretation. However, Einstein's correspondence after 1935 on EPR, or in his 
publications on EPR such as a 1936 paper "Physics and Reality", reveal that Einstein 
ruled out locality for ψ-ontic hidden variable theories. Indeed the only realistic 
interpretation of quantum states that could possibly be local is ψ-epistemic, but the ψ-
ontic model must be non-local.
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The EPR paper was not written by Einstein. In a 1935 letter to Schrödinger Einstein 
wrote, "For reasons of language this [paper] was written by Podolsky after many 
discussions. But still it has not come out as well as I really wanted; on the contrary, 
the main point was, so to speak, buried by the erudition".
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Einstein wrote in "Physics and Reality":
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 Consider a mechanical system consisting of 
two partial systems A and B which interact with each other only during a limited time. 
ψ is the wavefunction before their interaction. One performs measurements on A and 
determines A's state. Then B's ψ function of the partial system B is determined from 
the measurement made, and from the ψ function of the total system. This 
determination gives a result which depends upon which of the observables of A have 
been measured (coordinates or momenta). That is, depending upon the choice of 
observables of A to be measured, according to quantum mechanics we have to assign 
different quantum states ψB and ψB' to B. These quantum states are different from one 
another. 
In the above letter to Schrödinger Einstein explains,
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"After the collision, the real state of (AB) consists precisely of the real state A and the 
real state of B, which two states have nothing to do with one another. The real state of 
B thus cannot depend upon the kind of measurement I carry out on A. But then for the 
same state of B there are two (in general arbitrarily many) equally justified ψB, which 
contradicts the hypothesis of a one-to-one or complete description of the real state".  
And he ends his 1936 paper by saying:
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 "Since there can be only one physical state 
of B after the interaction which cannot reasonably be considered to depend on the 
particular measurement we perform on the system A separated from B it may be 
concluded that the ψ function is not unambiguously coordinated to the physical state. 
This coordination of several ψ functions to the same physical state of system B shows 
again that the ψ function cannot be interpreted as a (complete) description of a 
physical state of a single system. Here also the coordination of the ψ function to an 
ensemble of systems eliminates every difficulty". 
There is a resemblance between Einstein's Hole argument from the 1914 "Entwurf" 
theory of general relativity and Einstein's above views on incompleteness. In 1914 
Einstein wrote:
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 "With respect to K there then existed different solutions G(x) and 
G'(x), which are different from one another, nevertheless at the boundary of the region 
both solutions coincide, i.e., what is happening cannot be determined uniquely by 
generally-covariant differential equations for the gravitational field." The correction 
should be that the reference system has no meaning and that the realization of two 
gravitational fields in the same region of the continuum is impossible.     
Hence, we can call Einstein's above views on incompleteness by the name: a quantum 
hole argument; then according to Einstein, quantum physics is not ontic complete 
because for the same state of B there are two equally justified ψB.  
In his Autobiographical Notes Einstein writes:
17
 "If now the physicists A and B accept 
this reasoning as valid, then B will have to give up his position that the ψ-function 
constitutes a complete description of a real state. For in this case it would be 
impossible that two different types of ψ-functions could be assigned to the identical 
state of S2". 
PBR then suggest,
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"An important step towards the derivation of our result is the idea that the quantum 
state is physical if distinct quantum states correspond to non-overlapping distributions 
for λ [the set of possible physical states that a system can be in…]". 
Indeed the PBR argument:
 19
 "depends on few assumptions. One is that a system has a 
'real physical state' – not necessarily completely described by quantum theory, but 
objective and independent of the observer. This assumption only needs to hold for 
systems that are isolated, and not entangled with other systems". It seems that the 
1936 Einstein agrees with PBR.  
Hence, "if the quantum state is a physical property of the system and apparatus, it is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that each macroscopically different component has a 
direct counterpart in reality".
20  
And PBR now present Einstein's quantum hole argument:
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 "The general notion that two distinct quantum states may describe the same state of 
reality, however, has a long history. For example, in a letter to Schrödinger containing 
a variant of the famous EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) argument, Einstein argues 
from locality to the conclusion that […]", and PBR cite the above paragraph from 
Einstein's 1935 letter to Schrödinger saying that for the same state of B there are two 
equally justified ψB".  
They then further explain:
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"In this version of the argument, Einstein really is concerned with the possibility that 
there are two distinct quantum states for the same reality. He is not concluding that 
there are two different states of reality corresponding to the same quantum state 
(which would be the more commonly understood notion of incompleteness associated 
with Einstein)".  
In a previous version of their ArXiv paper PBR speak more clearly:
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As far as we are aware, the precise formalisation of our question first appeared in 
Harrigan and Spekkens, where it is attributed to Hardy. But note that the general idea 
that two distinct quantum states may describe the same state of reality has a long 
history going back to Einstein. For example, in a letter to Schrödinger containing a 
variant of the famous EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) argument, Einstein argues from 
locality to the conclusion that [… quoting Einstein's argument]. In this version of the 
argument, Einstein really is concerned with the idea that there are two distinct 
quantum states for the same reality, and not with the idea that there are two different 
states of reality corresponding to the same quantum state (the more commonly 
understood notion of incompleteness)". 
However, the PBR theorem does not rule "Bohr" who believes in quantum physics 
that is epistemic complete (Wavefunctions are epistemic, but there is no underlying 
ontic hidden variable states theory
24
). Indeed PBR are aware of this possibility: "The 
PBR theorem only holds for systems that have 'real physical state' – not necessarily 
completely described by quantum theory, but objective and independent of the 
observer. This assumption only needs to hold for systems that are isolated, and not 
entangled with other systems. Nonetheless, this assumption, or some part of it, would 
be denied by instrumentalist approaches to quantum theory, wherein the quantum 
state is merely a calculational tool for making predictions concerning macroscopic 
measurement outcomes".
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It seems that the PBR theorem does not end the century-old debate about the ontology 
of quantum states. It does not prove, with mathematical certitude, that the ontic 
interpretation is right and the epistemic one is wrong. 
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